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Abstract—In this paper, we analyzed Hsu-Chuang scheme 
and presented the vulnerability. We further secured their 
protocol by proposing a novel protocol that overcomes the 
above limitation while achieving the same security features. 
Besides, we made a demonstration of the correctness of our 
new scheme and analyzed the security properties. After 
compared Hsu-Chuang scheme and the new scheme, we 
also illustrated an example to illustrate the application of 
our improved protocol. 
 
Index Terms—key agreement, user anonymity, mutual 
authentication, forward security, backward security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the distributed computing environments, entity 
authentication is crucial to prevent unauthorized entities 
from obtaining system resources. Usually, the process of 
authentication involves the exchanges of entities’ 
identities, and authenticated key generation, etc. 
However, in some applications, it is desirable or even 
necessary to maintain entity anonymity, because a lot of 
sensitive information such as entity’s identification, 
entity movement, individual preferences or web surfing 
patterns can be collected if the entities identifications are 
not protected during the authentication process. 
Therefore, those schemes that do not preserve users’ 
anonymity cannot apply well to those environments 
where the protection of entities’ identities is required. 
In 2000, Lee and Chang [1] proposed a user 
identification scheme with key distribution maintaining 
user anonymity for distributed computer networks. Wu 
and Hsu, however, showed that the Lee-Chang scheme is 
insecure against impersonation and identity disclosure 
attacks [2]. An adversary can plot an impersonation 
attack to masquerade as a service provider in order to 
exchange a session key with a user without being 
detected in the authentication protocol. In addition, an 
adversary can plot the disclosure attack to identify a user 
who requests services with a released session key. Wu 
and Hsu further proposed an improved scheme to 
withstand these two attacks, preserving the same security 
requirements as those of the Lee-Chang scheme.  
Recently, Yang et al. demonstrated a compromising 
attack whereby it is possible for an adversary to derive 
the private keys of users who request services [3]. Yang 
et al. also proposed an improvement to the Wu-Hsu 
scheme to eliminate such a security leak and achieve the 
same security requirements. Mangipudi and Katti [4] 
later demonstrated a Deniable-of-Service (DoS) attack 
on the Yang et al. scheme. An adversary can cause the 
server to deny the requests of a legitimate user by 
tampering with the transmitted messages. In order to 
withstand such a DoS attack, Mangipudi and Katti 
further employed a digital signature to protect the 
integrity of the transmitted messages. 
Hsu and Chuang [5], however, demonstrated an 
identity disclosure attack on the Yang et al. and 
Mangipudi-Katti schemes [4] to show that their claimed 
user anonymity requirement is violated. That is, the 
identity of the communicating user can be easily 
ascertained from the exchanged messages. They 
proposed a novel user identification scheme with key 
distribution preserving user anonymity which eliminates 
these security leaks and achieves all of the 
above-mentioned properties. 
In this paper, we proposed a novel user 
identification scheme with key distribution preserving 
user anonymity (SAIKA) which eliminated the security 
vulnerability well and achieves all the security properties 
of previous schemes. 
We intend to design a secure key agreement 
protocol for distributed computer networks, which is 
expected to inherit all the good virtues of the previous 
schemes and some added security properties. Here we 
summarize all these requirements to evaluate our new 
scheme as follows. 
User Anonymity: The scheme should preserve the 
 user’s identity, namely, a server could not tell a user’s 
identity. Once the connection between the user and the 
server has been established, the probability of the server 
to guess the user’s identity is 1/n, where n is the number 
of ring members.  
Security of Session Key: The scheme should 
preserve the security of session key, that is to say, when 
executing our improved protocol, except the 
correspondence patties nobody outside could acquire the 
session key. 
Mutual Authentication: The scheme should assure 
that not only can the server verify the legal user, but the 
user can also verify the server. In authenticated protocols, 
mutual authentication is an important attribute, so our 
scheme should also be in favor of it perfectly. 
Forward Secrecy and Backward Secrecy: The 
scheme should satisfy forward secrecy and backward 
secrecy, namely, if the session key generated in j period 
has been leaked, the attacker can’t forge any session key 
generated before j period or after j period. Therefore, the 
scheme should defeat some attacks like replay attack and 
so on.  
II. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
Similar to Hsu-Chuang scheme [5], our proposed 
scheme (SAIKA) also consists of three types of entities 
(a SCPC, the users and the servers). We start by present 
our scheme in detail, and then discuss the security of the 
concrete scheme. 
A. Protocol description  
The SCPC chooses two large primes p and q, 
computes N = pq, and determines (e, d) such that ed = 
1mod φ(N), where φ(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1). The SCPC 
randomly chooses an element g ∈ ZN*, which is the 
generator of both Zp* and Zq*. The SCPC determines a 
symmetric-key cryptosystem. The symbol EK(m) denotes 
the encryption of the message m with a key K, and the 
symbol DK(c) denotes the decryption of the cipher text c 
with a key K. The SCPC determines a collision free 
secure one-way hash function h(.). Finally, the SCPC 
publishes (e, N, g) as public system parameters, while 
maintaining the secrecy of (d, p, q). 
(1) Registration phase 
The user Ui collects a group of n identities, and 
composes an identity list L = {ID1, …, IDn}, including 
Ui’s own identity IDi = IDs (s ∈ [1, n]). Then the user Ui 
submits L to the SCPC for registration. On receiving L, 
the SCPC uses a private key d to generate Ui’s private 
key {Si} as Si = IDid mod N (i ∈ [1, n]). Then, the SCPC 
sends the private key {Si} to Ui via a secure channel.  
The service provider Pj submits an IDj to the SCPC 
for registration. On receiving IDj, the SCPC uses a 
private key d to generate Pj’s private key Sj as Sj = IDjd 
mod N. Then, the SCPC sends the private key Sj to or Pj 
via a secure channel. 
(2) Anonymous authentication and key agreement 
phase 
If user Ui wants to gain access privilege from 
service provider Pj, Ui and Pj will cooperatively perform 
the following steps. 
1. The user Ui submits the service request to the 
service provider Pj. Ui chooses a random number r, 
computes 
C = r ⊕ h(IDj||T0), 
and then sends (C, T0) to Pj. 
2. Pj chooses a random number k, computes 
r = C ⊕ h(IDj||T0) 
Z = gk Sjr mod N, 
and then sends Z back to Ui. 
3. After receiving Z from Pj, Ui chooses a random 
number t and computes: 
α = Ze IDj-r mod N, 
Kij = αt mod N, 
w = get mod N. 
4. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Pj computes 
( || || || ) modijh K Z w Tti ix g S N= , 
1( ,..., )ijK ny E ID ID=  
where T is the current timestamp. Note that Kij is 
regarded as the session key shared between Ui and Pj. 
Then, Ui sends the message (w, {xi}, y, T) to Pj. 
5. When Pj receives (w, {xi}, y, T), the validity of T 
is first checked. If it is invalid, Pj aborts the protocol; 
otherwise, Kij is derived via the following equation: 
Kij = wk mod N. 
6. Pj uses the key Kij to decrypt y as 
( )
ijK
L D y= , 
and verifies the validity of the recovered identifier IDi by 
checking 
?( || || || ) (mod )ijh K Z w T ei iwID x N= . 
If this equation holds, Pj is convinced that Ui is an 
authorized user. 
7. Pj computes Di as 
Di = h(Kij||T'||{IDi}||IDj) 
and sends (Di, T')to Ui, where T' is the current 
timestamp. 
8. Upon receiving (Di, T') from Pj, Ui first checks 
the validity of T'. If it is a valid timestamp, Ui computes 
 Di' = h(Kij||T'||{IDi}||IDj) and checks if Di' is identical to 
the received Di. If it holds, Ui is convinced that Pj is the 
valid service provider. 
(3) Reveal User’s Identity 
If Pj wants to confirm that Ui is the real user, he 
could send a request to SCPC, and SCPC will verify Ui’s 
identity.  
1. Pj computes
1({ } || )jS iE x T
, and sends it to SCPC 
as the request to verify Ui’s identity. 
2. Ui computes xs as  
( || || || ) modijh K Z w Tts sx g S N=  and 2( || )iS sE x T , 
and then sends 
2( || )iS sE x T
 to SCPC. 
3. SCPC encrypts 
1({ }|| )jS iE x T  
and 
2( || )iS sE x T , 
and then verifies xs. if there is xi (∈ {xi}) is equal to xs, 
SCPC believes that Ui is the real user, and sends {xi, T2} 
to Pj. 
B. Correctness proof 
In this section we will give the correctness 
demonstration of our scheme. 
(1) 
?
ij ijK K=  
Kij = αt mod N 
= (Ze IDj-1) t mod N 
= ((gk Sj) e IDj-1) t mod N 
= (getk) mod N 
= (get) k mod N 
= wk mod N 
(2) 
?( || || || ) (mod )ijh K Z w T ei iwID x N=  
( || || || ) ( || || || )
( || || || )
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C. Security analysis 
Here we will discuss the security properties of our 
proposed scheme, so as to show our scheme meets all the 
requirements presented in section 1.  
User Anonymity: After receiving Z from Pj, Ui 
chooses a random number t, and then for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 
Pj computes ( || || || ) modijh K Z w Tti ix g S N=  to compose {xi}. 
Besides it, Pj could use the key Kij to decrypt y and get L 
= {ID1, …, IDn}. But Pj can not tell the identity of the 
user from all these information, and the only clue Pj can 
get is that the user is someone among the list L = 
{ID1, …, IDn}. 
It should be pointed out that Pj in our scheme is 
always assumed to be honest. Indeed, a malicious service 
provider could learn whether the identity of user is the 
guessed identity IDi ∈ L for some i by choosing a unique 
ID* and some random numbers for computing 
( || || || ) modijh K Z w Tti ix g S N= . If the equation can pass the 
verification ( || || || ) (mod )ijh K Z w T ei iwID x N= , then Pj could 
learn that the identity of user is ID*. However, such a 
cheating could be successful with a probability of 1/n 
and it could also be detected by user with a probability of 
1/n, which will ruin the reputation of Pj. So, it is 
reasonable to assume that Pj is honest in our scheme. 
Security of Session Key: The session key Kij = αt 
mod N = (Ze IDj-1) t mod N = wk mod N, if the adversary 
wants to acquire the session key, he need to compute Z = 
gk Sj mod N. As r and k are random numbers chosen by 
the user Ui and the service provider Pj respectively, Sj is 
the private key owned by the Pj only, the adversary can’t 
computes the session key Kij. 
Mutual Authentication: In our scheme, not only 
can the server verify the legal users, but the users can 
verify the legal service provider. We will show that our 
scheme achieves mutual authentication as follows. 
No one can impersonate a legal user to request the 
service from the service provider in our new scheme 
SAIKA. Because of the hardness of discrete logarithms, 
it is computationally infeasible for the attacker to 
calculate the session key, without which it is hard for an 
attack to forge (w, {xi}, y, T). Therefore, the attacker can 
not establish a session key with service provider to 
authenticate himself as a legal user.  
If an attacker wants to masquerade as the service 
provider, he should compute Z = gk Sj mod N, so he need 
to get Sj, however, Sj is the private key of the service 
provider from SCPC, and it is nearly impossible for the 
attacker to know it. Therefore, we can say it is only the 
service provider that can authenticate itself to the user.  
Forward Secrecy and Backward Secrecy: As t 
and k are both selected by the user and the service 
provider randomly, the session key of every period has 
no relation with each other. Therefore, if the session key 
generated in j period has been leaked, the attacker can’t 
get any information of the session key generated before j 
period or after j period. 
Our scheme can defeat replay attack. The messages 
transmitted over the network in our scheme can not be 
intercepted for reuse, because of the involvement of 
timestamp T and T'. And the server could check the 
freshness of a received message by testing whether the 
 transmission time is within legal transmission delay.  
D. Comparison 
Compared with Hsu-Chuang scheme, our scheme 
not only defends the private key disclosure attack of it, 
but also has some characters that it doesn’t have. 
In Hsu-Chuang scheme, if the user Ui wants to 
request a service from the service provider Pj, he only 
needs to send a service request, however, there exists a 
problem that the attacker may send lots of request to 
interfere other legal users’ request. However, in SIAKA, 
if Ui wants to request a service, he should chooses a 
random number r and computes C = r ⊕ h(IDj||T0). As h(.) 
is a one-way hash function and T0 is a timestamp, the 
attacker can not send the service request randomly. 
Therefore, our scheme provides a way to defend illegal 
requests effectively. 
Hsu-Chuang scheme requires that the identity of a 
user should be explicitly specified to facilitate 
authentication and further key exchange, which may 
violate users’ privacy in some privacy sensitive 
applications, such as online drug store. However, in our 
new scheme, we address such issue. In SIAKA, the user 
Ui collects a group of n identities, and composes an 
identity list L = {ID1, …, IDn}, including Ui’s own 
identity ID = IDs (s ∈ [1, n]). Ui sends the n identities to 
the service provider Pj, so Pj does not know which the 
real identity of Ui is. Although Pj could guess it with the 
possibility of 1/n, where n is large enough, the possibility 
will be very low. Introduction 
In Hsu-Chuang scheme, the user’s identity is 
specified to the service provider, but our scheme 
conceals the user’s real identity in a group of identities. 
In order to confirm the user’s identity, the user should 
reveal his identity to SCPC. In SIAKA, if Pj wants to 
confirm that Ui is the real user, he could send a request to 
SCPC, and SCPC will compare the received {xi} to 
verify Ui’s real identity. 
III. APPLICATION 
As far as user privacy and anonymity is concerned, 
research on this topic usually focuses on two issues: 
anonymous communication and user anonymity [8]. 
Anonymous communication usually provides a 
communication channel that resists traffic analysis, so 
that the communicating parties can be anonymous 
against the eavesdroppers. A more complicated and 
seemingly paradoxical issue is user anonymity, which let 
the users hide their identities from the communicating 
peers. Here we use a concrete application of SAIKA to 
discuss user anonymity in the environment of distributed 
networks authentication.  
A user Bob wants to download some files from a 
website Cindy; however, he doesn’t want to disclose his 
identity. We assume that Alice is a trusted third party. 
The process can be described as follows. 
(1) Alice uses a private key d to generate Bob’s 
private key {Si} as Si = IDid mod N (IDi ∈ L, where L is a 
group of n identities collected by Bob) and Cindy’s 
private key Sj as Sj = IDjd mod N. Then, Alice sends the 
private key Si and Sj to Bob and Cindy respectively via a 
secure channel.  
(2) Bob submits the service request to Cindy. 
(3) After receiving Bob’s service request, Cindy 
computes Z and sends Z to Bob.  
(4) Bob computes the session key Kij and encrypts L 
with Kij. Finally, Bob sends the results to Cindy with the 
timestamp. 
(5) Cindy computes Kij and uses it to decrypt the 
received information, and then Cindy verifies the 
information received from Bob. 
(6) Cindy sends the decrypted L to Bob with some 
change for verification.  
(7) Bob verifies the results, if the equation holds, 
Bob trusts that Alice is the real vendor and establishes 
the connection with Cindy. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we exploited the weaknesses of a 
recently proposed user identification scheme with key 
preserving user anonymity for distributed computer 
networks (Hsu-Chuang scheme). That is, the service 
provider could get the user’s private key, and then 
simulate the user to send the service request to other 
service providers. After that, we proposed a new scheme 
to overcome this limitation while achieving the same set 
of security properties. Then, we demonstrated the 
correctness of SIAKA and analyze the security properties 
of it. After that, we compared the differences of the two 
schemes. We also gave an example to illustrate the 
application of SIAKA. 
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